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INTRODUCTION
11 lith such profound consequences as these potentially in the balance, the quest for bipartisanship in American foreign policy, according to the two former secretaries of state, is as important now as it ever was. Consensus of this nature in government, however, requires that the president and Congress overcome political institutional rivalries to establish common foreign policy goals and an agreed upon framework for reconciling their differences. It is a commonly held assumption that such a situation existed in this country beginning in the aftermath of World War II and ending in the American involvement in Vietnam (Destler, Gelb, and Lake 1984; Peppers 1975 ). According to Wittkopf (1990 Wittkopf (1990) have questioned much of the common wisdom concerning bipartisanship and its demise after Vietnam. They find that partisan political differences were also salient during the peak of Cold War consensus and that the effects of the war in Vietnam on the breakdown of bipartisan presidential support in Congress cannot be distinguished from other concurrent political developments. Given these findings, it is important for researchers to explore more systematically alternative explanations of the rise and decline of bipartisanship. If this phenomenon never really characterized American foreign policy, the possibility of its return as envisioned by Kissinger and Vance is dubious at best.
My primary goal is to develop a comprehensive model of bipartisan congressional support of presidents from 1947 through 1988 on foreign policy and defense roll-call votes to determine what factors lead Republicans and Democrats to overcome their political differences on these issues. Such a model will serve two purposes. First, I seek to bring together the research findings not only on bipartisanship in foreign policy but also on presidential influence in Congress and legislative processes to develop a more fully integrated framework for explaining and predicting executive-congressional relations. The statistical test of this model via probit analysis ought to provide us with a more rigorous examination of the impact of the diverse universe of explanatory factors than is often obtained in this type of research. Probit allows me to focus on the individual roll-call vote as the unit of analysis in order to gain a clearer appreciation of specific explanatory factors than is normally possible with more aggregated data. Second, the model will give us a means by which to analyze more systematically the impact of the war in Vietnam on bipartisanship in American foreign policy. This research effort examines bipartisan support of presidents in the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate on foreign policy and defense roll-call votes from 1947 through 1988 on which the president had taken a position as determined by Congressional Quarterly. When Congressional Quarterly did not provide direct evidence of the president's position, the yearly almanac was used as the primary data source. The dependent variables, H-BIPART and S-BIPART, are defined as occurring when a majority of Republicans and a majority of Democrats support the president's position in the House of Representatives and Senate, respectively. The foreign policy and defense issues include all roll-call votes pertaining to issues the unit of analysis), a more amplified conceptualization of the term is necessary to establish the validity of its possible causal antecedents. First, bipartisanship in foreign policy is ultimately a response to domestic and/or international pressures that bring the two political parties and the two branches of government together. Absent any compelling interest in muting partisan views on this subject, we might expect these actors to develop a foreign policy agenda that mirrors their differences on domestic issues. Bipartisanship ought to be most prevalent when political developments outside Washington create for Republicans and Democrats, and Congress and the White House, a shared perception of common political goals. Second, the existence of bipartisanship in congressional-executive branch relations implies agreement between the two branches on both the policy itself and the framework for developing consensus on foreign policy issues (Crabb 1957) . The existence of bipartisanship thus requires that Congress produce legislation the president agrees or acquiesces to, and that the president retain a capacity to bring about a favorable compromise if and when political differences arise. Thus, the practices, strategies, and resources of each branch ought to play a crucial role in determining the likelihood of consensus. The congressional environment in which legislation takes shape and the role and influence of the president in this process provide the institutional political context within which bipartisanship may 'I have excluded votes pertaining to immigration policy, veterans issues, and domestic military construction projects. We may expect the existence of these congressional norms and procedures (or conditions as they are henceforth designated) to increase or decrease the likelihood that a majority of Republicans and a majority of Democrats will adopt a foreign policy that is congruent with the president's wishes. Below I outline those conditions I expect will influence the voting alignments of roll-call votes in such a way as to make the probability of bipartisan support of presidents significantly more or less likely. Salient Issues. In his analysis of bipartisanship, Hughes (1978) finds that Congress is most likely to become involved in the policy-making process when there is an economic component to a foreign policy issue. Congressional control of the purse strings and interest in international economic issues that affect important constituencies give Congress more of an incentive to follow its own particular preferences than a more nationally minded president. Hughes demonstrates that votes on economic issues such as tariff rates and foreign aid engender significant levels of partisanship across time. In addition, Peppers (1975) argues that the increasing salience of nonsecurity issues in the 1970s constrains presidential latitude in foreign policy. He writes that "the seamlessness of the distinction between international economic and domestic economic policy may simply extend the president's weakness in domestic policy to foreign policy as well" (469). Therefore, we ought to expect that the likelihood of bipartisan presidential support on roll-call votes on these policies will be low. While it is not possible to measure the domestic economic import of all foreign policy and defense votes, it is possible to isolate three particular issue areas where such concerns are likely to arise: (1) appropriations, (2) foreign aid, and (3) Given the partisan nature of many amendments, presidents who weigh into this legislative wrangling to express positions on such votes ought to find their chances of success considerably diminished. Given the increasing number of Republicans and Democrats alike who use the amending process to score political with interest groups and constituents back home, we should find the probability of bipartisan support on amendments severely constrained by the very nature of the vote itself. It is possible that the expansion of such votes during the 1970s and 1980s helped in part to create the perception of the Vietnam syndrome because many of the congressional reforms occurred in close proximity to the end of the Vietnam War. Ultimately, however, the use of amendments has often been a means by which minority parties and disgruntled members of the majority have attempted to challenge the work of committees. As such, we ought to expect that whenever presidents take a position on such votes, the probability of bipartisan support ought to decrease. Thus: H8: The probability of bipartisan presidential support on amendments in Congress should decrease. Variable Name = Amendment 3Regular amendments, amendments to amendments, reservations to treaties in the Senate and substitute amendments are all included.
Senate Treaty Votes
One unique feature of the Senate that might exert a significant influence on the incidence of bipartisan presidential support is the Senate's role in ratifying treaties the executive branch has concluded with foreign nations. As others have indicated, treaties are routinely passed by overwhelming majorities (Sigelman 1979) . Only the most contentious foreign policy issues tend to result in anything less than Senate unanimity. Therefore, I create a separate variable for all treaty ratification votes to control for its possibly confounding effects. Thus:
Hg: The probability of bipartisan presidential support should increase on treaty ratification votes in the Senate. Variable Name = Treaties
The Internal Environment-Presidential Influence in Congress Presidents' abilities to gain support in Congress on foreign policy issues have been undergoing an extensive revision in the literature (Peppers 1975; LeLoup and Shull 1979; Sigelman 1979; Fleisher and Bond 1988; McCormick and Wittkopf 1990
). Yet, while many have shown that presidential support on foreign policy issues has been declining, few have attempted to develop a comprehensive model to test alternative explanations of this phenomenon. Further still, little research has been devoted to determining if the locus of responsibility for this trend lies in presidential relations with the Congress or legislative developments over which presidents have little control. I attempted earlier to outline those factors originating in Congress that we might expect to contribute to the decline in presidential support. Now I discuss presidential resources and strategies that ought to affect the formation of bipartisan coalitions. I explain later why we might expect congressmen to be more or less responsive to particular presidential strategies and sources of influence. The President's Position on Legislation. When attempting to analyze presidential influence in Congress, it is important to know if presidents are working to pass or block final passage of legislation. Given the dominant tendency of Congress to pass the bills, resolutions, and conference reports that make it to the floor, presidents wishing to prevent legislation from becoming law will be at odds with the preference and goals of a majority party that dominates the legislative process. Although there are numerous points during this process where the president may derail legislation, once bills make it to a roll-call vote, they are almost always passed (Rohde 1991, 209) 
MODEL RESULTS
The results for the models are displayed in table 3 and table 4 and demonstrate substantial support for the hypotheses outlined above. Most of the variables are statistically significant and in the expected direction for both equations and the overall fit of the models is quite good. The Cold War consensus variable is highly significant in both equations as demonstrated by its T-statistic, and appears to exercise a substantial effect on the likelihood of bipartisanship. The most important determinants of such support, however, turn out to be the manner in which the issue was brought to a vote, the president's position on the legislation, the issue type and whether the vote was on a treaty in the Senate. Before proceeding to explore the impact of the independent variables; however, it is instructive to examine several of the goodness-of-fit measures the probit procedure generates. In order to test the significance of the model as a whole, twice the log likelihood ratio is computed (Aldrich and Nelson 1984) . This measure is analogous to the Fstatistic in regression and is distributed as a chi-square variable. It is 213.0 and 598.0 for the House and Senate models respectively, and both are significant at the .0001 level, which allows us to reject the null hypothesis that all coefficients, except the constant, are equal to zero. The probit technique also produces predictions of the actual values of the dependent variable. We find that the House model specified earlier is correct 74.1% of the time in predicting bipartisan presidential support and the absence of such endorsement. There is a 32% proportionate reduction in error over the null model that predicts the model value of the dependent variable in every case. No bipartisan presidential support occurs in 62.5% of the cases and is the predictive accuracy of the null model. The Senate model performs slightly better. It is correct in 76.1% of the cases, a 54% proportionate reduction in error over the null model that predicts bipartisanship to occur in every case. In the Senate, bipartisanship occurs 56.4% of the time. The theoretical models were also tested against another alternative that employed only dummy variables for all presidents. The predictive capacity of this model was only 67.1% for the House and 62.4% for the Senate.
Because of the difficulty in interpreting probit coefficients (Aldrich and Nelson 1984), I use the derivative at mean statistic to gauge the impact of the individual variables. The derivatives at mean gives the estimated increase in probability of a bipartisan coalition associated with a one-unit increase in an independent variable holding all other variables constant at their mean value. For example, the derivative at mean for the appropriations variable is -.129 in the House model, indicating that, on votes concerning this issue, the probability of a bipartisan presidential House, while only the foreign aid variable was statistically significant in the Senate model. The impact of each of these variables controlling for other factors is to decrease the estimated probability of bipartisanship in the House by 12.9%, 19.6%, and 19.7% respectively. In the Senate, the probability of bipartisanship on foreign aid votes decreases by an estimated 16.9%. The House at least does not appear willing to afford presidents general support on those issues most likely to affect their constituents. Perhaps because of the electoral cycle of the House, representatives feel they must be more attentive to their constituents' demands than senators. Yet as the distinction between domestic and foreign policy becomes ever more blurred and security issues lose their former salience, presidential-congressional disputes over these areas of legislation most probably will increase in both chambers.
As expected, Democratic presidents confronted with Republican congressional minorities face an uphill battle in gaining bipartisan endorsement of their views. Yet this variable is statistically significant only in the House. Here, the probability of such endorsement declines by 11.2% holding other variables constant at their mean value. As Fleisher and Bond (1988) argue, there are many incentives for minority parties, and the Republican party in particular, to express their differences with the party controlling both branches of government. Given the increasingly conservative nature of the Republican party it seems unlikely that such tactics will be dropped in the future. The absence of such an effect in the Senate may be due to the informal legislative procedures that smaller body is permitted that allow minority party members more opportunity to express their views.
Votes on amendments substantially reduce the possibility of bipartisanship. When controlling for other factors, the estimated probability of bipartisan presidential support on amendments declines by 31.8% in the House and 23.8% in the Senate. Often amendments have been used to introduce issues and viewpoints at variance with the majority party and as such are unlikely to gather widespread bipartisan backing. Although it is generally the case that whenever presidents take positions on such votes they are unlikely to be favored with the support of majorities in both parties, during the 1970s and 1980s the increased use of amendments very likely expanded the scope of political conflict on the floor. Future research should investigate the substantive content of votes on amendments to study the changing nature of the legislative agenda and its effect on presidential support. In the Senate, votes on treaties result in bipartisanship on nearly every occasion. The probability of such support increases by an estimated 237.0%, holding other variables constant at their mean value. This unrealistic estimate of the effect of treaty votes on bipartisanship is due largely to a skewed distribution of the variable. Only 1.2% of these votes (4 out of 338) were not bipartisan. The insignificance of many of these treaties appears to make bipartisan unanimity only a formality.
Presidents in general appear to have only limited influence over roll-call votes in Congress. The presidential popularity variable is significant and in the expected direction in the House, although its impact is rather weak. The estimated increase in probability of bipartisan coalitions occurring with every additional increment in public approval is only .2%, holding other variables constant at their mean value.
For example, on average a president with a 60% approval rating is only 4% more likely to be supported by a bipartisan coalition than a president with a 40% approval rating. In the Senate, the variable is statistically insignificant and exerts no measurable influence on the incidence of bipartisanship. This finding would seem to support Edwards' and Bond and Fleisher's contention that popularity operates largely on the margins in influencing a congressman's votes. Perhaps most importantly, the results demonstrate that when presidents are opposed to legislation, the probability of bipartisanship declines by nearly 74% in the House and 144.7% in the Senate with the usual caveats. Again, the unrealistic derivative at mean statistic for the presidential opposition variable largely results from its skewed distribution. For example, only on two occasions when presidents were opposed to passage of a bill, resolution, or conference report was their position endorsed by a bipartisan majority in the House. The majority parties in Congress appear committed to implementing their agendas often regardless of the wishes of the president. Clearly, there is little a president can do to derail a determined legislative juggernaut. Such findings demonstrate the need for more of an emphasis on the legislative process and congressional preferences in the literature on presidential influence. Because presidents may often be reacting to a proactive legislative agenda, the possibilities for influence may not always be great. I now turn to possible improvements in the model and the implications of these findings.
CONCLUSIONS
Obviously there was a strong degree of bipartisanship in congressional support of presidents on foreign policy and defense issues before America's involvement in Vietnam. After this conflict, consensus broke down and was replaced with much more conflictual voting behavior. While I agree with McCormick and Wittkopf (1990) and others who find evidence of partisanship during earlier years, such conflict was not nearly as visible, frequent, and deep as it has been in later times. Having made these claims, however, it is also extremely important to call attention to the findings in this paper concerning the significance of the congressional institutional context, and the ineffectiveness of presidential resources. The most significant and powerful explanatory factors were related to the manner in which issues were brought up for a vote, the issue type, and the president's position on a vote. These factors, coupled with the limited influence of presidential popularity, illustrate the problems of both pre-and post-Vietnam syndrome presidents in obtaining bipartisan support for their views. Presidential support in Congress seems to be predominantly affected by congressional procedures and norms rather than by presidential actions. Future research in this area, however, should focus on the evidence of bipartisan presidential support on major legislation to determine whether these findings are generalizable. Given that all roll-call votes were analyzed in this study, it is conceivable that presidential influence and support is greater on more important votes and/or that a large number of roll-call votes on narrow and previously insignificant legislation are making the post-Vietnam years appear much more divisive than they really are. This possibility and the changing nature and expansion of the legislative agenda will be explored in later research.
Finally, in the absence of any compelling threat to the nation's security, the prospects for the return of a more solid consensus on foreign policy and defense issues appear negligible. Congressional incentives to appeal to important constituents with contentious legislation, to criticize weak chief executives, and evermounting domestic problems make all but the most short-run bipartisanship seem a thing of the past. And while the Persian Gulf war witnessed a largely subservient and supportive Congress, both the prewar buildup and postwar problems in Iraq and the Middle East were the subject of considerable partisan debate. In addition, in this era of divided party control of government, rather than forming long-term alliances with Congress to confront national security problems, presidents may have to focus their attention on developing specific issue-based coalitions to obtain congressional support. Ultimately, without any strong incentives for stopping politics at the water's edge, the president and Congress will in all probability continue to shape foreign policy according to their own political needs.
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